



How Does Mass Media Shape Social Reality? An Analysis of Communication Technology's Influence on the Construction of Public Opinion, Popular Culture, and Ideological Hegemony in the Digital Information Era

Arief Marizki Purba^{1*}, Mazdalifah², Fatma Wardy Lubis³

¹²³Department of Communication Studies, Universitas Sumatera Utara, Medan, Indonesia

*Correspondence: ariefmp@usu.ac.id | mazdalifah@usu.ac.id | fatma.wardy@usu.ac.id

Article Info :

Received:

21/02/2026

Revised:

22/02/2026

Accepted:

26/02/2026

ABSTRACT

In an era defined by the relentless proliferation of digital communication platforms, the question of how mass media constructs, reinforces, and contests social reality has never been more urgent. This study examines the mechanisms through which digital communication technologies shape public opinion formation, popular culture production, and ideological hegemony in contemporary Indonesian society. Employing a critical mixed-methods approach combining a quantitative survey of 428 digital media users across three metropolitan areas, critical discourse analysis of 240 news items from six major online platforms, and 32 in-depth interviews with media consumers and producers, the research investigates the processes through which mediated representations become socially accepted as reality. Drawing on constructionist epistemology, Gramsci's theory of hegemony, Hall's encoding/decoding model, and Bourdieu's field theory, the study demonstrates that digital media platforms function not merely as neutral conduits of information but as active sites of ideological production that systematically privilege certain interpretive frames, identities, and social hierarchies over others. Survey results reveal that 74.3% of respondents regard online news as their primary source of reality-definition, while discourse analysis exposes consistent patterns of frame alignment between political-economic elites and dominant media representations. The findings contribute to a sociologically grounded understanding of digital media power and propose critical media literacy as an essential democratic competency in the algorithmically curated information environment.

Keywords: mass media; social reality construction; public opinion; popular culture; ideological hegemony; digital communication; media literacy; Indonesia



©2022 Authors.. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License.
(<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>)

INTRODUCTION

"The medium is the message." — Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media*

McLuhan's celebrated aphorism, penned at the dawn of the television age, has acquired a depth its author could scarcely have anticipated in the era of algorithmic social media, artificial intelligence-curated newsfeeds, and ubiquitous smartphone connectivity. The medium through which information is transmitted does not merely carry content—it actively structures the cognitive, emotional, and social frameworks through which reality itself is experienced, interpreted, and contested. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the digital revolution has dramatically

intensified the speed, scale, and pervasiveness of media's reality-constructing function, producing what Lash (2002) calls an 'information society' in which symbolic flows increasingly constitute—rather than merely represent—social relations.

Indonesia presents a particularly compelling context for examining digital media's reality-shaping power. With over 204 million internet users (We Are Social, 2024) and a media landscape characterized by rapid platform diversification, concentrated ownership, and intense political polarization, Indonesia's digital information environment embodies both the democratizing promise and the ideological dangers of the social media era. The country's complex history of state media control under the New Order regime (1966–1998), the post-Reformasi explosion of press freedom, and the subsequent re-consolidation of media ownership by politically affiliated conglomerates create a layered context in which questions of media power, reality construction, and hegemony resonate with urgent democratic significance.

Social constructionism, as theorized by Berger and Luckmann (1966) in their foundational work *The Social Construction of Reality*, provides the epistemological foundation for this inquiry. What human beings experience as 'objective reality' is not a transparent given but a socially produced and maintained construction, sustained through processes of typification, institutionalization, and legitimation. Mass media, in contemporary societies, constitutes one of the most powerful institutional mechanisms through which social reality is constructed, maintained, and challenged—selecting which events become news, which interpretations become 'common sense,' and which social actors are granted legitimacy and voice.

Critical cultural studies perspectives—particularly Gramsci's (1971) theory of hegemony and Hall's (1980) encoding/decoding model—enrich this constructionist framework by attending to the power dimensions of the reality-construction process. Hegemony refers to the process through which dominant social groups secure consent for their privileged position by naturalizing their particular worldview as universal common sense, a process in which media plays a central role. Hall's encoding/decoding model illuminates how media texts are produced within frameworks of dominant ideology but may be received and decoded differently by audiences positioned variously in relation to those dominant codes.

This study addresses four interconnected research questions: (1) To what extent does digital media consumption shape respondents' perceptions of social reality, public issues, and political actors? (2) What ideological frames dominate in major Indonesian online news media, and how do these frames align with media ownership interests? (3) How do digital media platforms function in the production and circulation of popular culture, and what are the implications for Indonesian cultural identity? (4) What forms of critical media literacy can empower citizens to navigate and resist the hegemonic tendencies of algorithmically mediated information environments?

Table 1. Digital Media Consumption Patterns Among Survey Respondents (N = 428)

Platform Type	Daily Use (%)	Primary News Source (%)	Trust Level (1–5)	Reality-Defining Role (%)
Social Media (Instagram, TikTok, Twitter/X)	87.1%	62.4%	3.21	71.8%
News Portals (Kompas, Detik, Tribun)	74.3%	74.3%	3.87	68.9%
YouTube / Video Streaming	81.2%	44.8%	3.44	61.4%
WhatsApp Groups	91.4%	38.6%	3.12	54.2%
Television (broadcast/streaming)	54.9%	48.1%	3.68	58.7%

Source: Survey data, 2024. Reality-Defining Role = percentage identifying platform as primary source for understanding social reality.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Social Constructionism and Media Power

Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's seminal work *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966) established a foundational premise for understanding media power: reality is not simply discovered as an objective given but is socially produced through interaction, shared meanings, and institutional legitimation. Within this framework, knowledge emerges from ongoing processes of externalization, objectivation, and internalization. Individuals collectively create meanings (externalization), these meanings become sedimented into institutions and taken-for-granted facts (objectivation), and subsequently individuals absorb them as natural reality (internalization). Mass media plays a decisive role in accelerating and stabilizing these processes at a societal scale.

Language occupies a central position in this constructionist paradigm. Through linguistic categorization, labeling, and narrative structuring, journalism, advertising, and entertainment industries create typifications that define social actors, events, and moral hierarchies. The "crime wave," the "corrupt politician," the "model citizen," or the "dangerous radical" are not neutral descriptors but symbolic constructions that frame public understanding. Media institutions therefore function as producers of a "symbolic universe"—a comprehensive interpretive framework that maps what exists, what is normal, what is deviant, and what futures appear imaginable. In complex modern societies where direct experience of political, economic, and global events is limited, citizens depend heavily on mediated representations to construct their social reality.

Todd Gitlin (1980) deepened this analysis through his influential concept of media frames. Frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation that journalists employ to organize and make sense of complex events. They operate as interpretive schemata that highlight certain aspects of reality while obscuring others. Importantly, frames are not ideologically neutral. They embed assumptions about causality (who is responsible), moral evaluation (who is right or wrong), and prescription (what should be done). By selecting sources, emphasizing particular statistics, privileging certain narratives, and marginalizing alternative perspectives, frames shape the boundaries of legitimate debate. In this way, media power is exercised less through overt censorship and more through structured selectivity—defining the "common sense" parameters within which discussion unfolds.

In the digital age, framing processes are no longer confined to editorial newsrooms. Algorithmic systems now play an increasingly central role in organizing public visibility. Recommendation engines embedded within platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and TikTok determine which content is surfaced, amplified, or buried. These systems analyze behavioral data—clicks, watch time, shares, and engagement patterns—to rank and distribute information. As Eli Pariser (2011) argues in his "filter bubble" thesis, personalized algorithms can isolate users within ideologically homogeneous information environments, reinforcing pre-existing beliefs while limiting exposure to dissenting viewpoints.

Shoshana Zuboff (2019) further conceptualizes this dynamic within the broader logic of surveillance capitalism, in which user data is commodified to predict and modify behavior for profit. Algorithmic curation thus introduces a new layer of framing—one that is opaque, automated, and commercially driven. Content that provokes strong emotional responses, moral outrage, or identity affirmation tends to generate higher engagement metrics and is therefore algorithmically amplified. Consequently, emotionally charged, politically polarizing, and sensationalist materials often dominate digital visibility. The social realities constructed in these environments are shaped not only by journalistic norms but also by platform economics and data-driven optimization strategies.

Hegemony, Ideology, and Digital Media in Indonesia

Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony provides a critical lens for analyzing how media systems sustain power relations. Hegemony refers to the process by which dominant groups secure consent rather than relying solely on coercion. Through cultural institutions—education, religion, and especially media—elite worldviews are naturalized as universal common sense. Ideology becomes effective precisely when it is perceived as neutral and self-evident rather than partisan or imposed.

In the Indonesian context, this framework remains highly relevant. Merlyna Lim (2017) demonstrates that despite Indonesia's post-authoritarian democratization and formally pluralistic media environment, ownership concentration significantly shapes content production. Seven major conglomerates dominate much of the national television, print, and digital landscape, many owned by politically connected elites with direct stakes in electoral competition and policymaking. This structural alignment creates conditions under which media narratives often converge with elite interests, particularly during election cycles or major political controversies.

Digitalization has not fundamentally disrupted these ownership structures; rather, it has intensified their reach. Traditional media corporations have expanded into online news portals, streaming platforms, and social media distribution channels. At the same time, political actors increasingly deploy coordinated digital campaigns, influencer networks, and bot-driven amplification strategies. Algorithmic systems further reinforce hegemonic dynamics by privileging content that aligns with dominant narratives and achieves high engagement. Thus, hegemony in contemporary Indonesia operates through a hybrid configuration: concentrated ownership, political-economic alliances, and platform-driven amplification mechanisms.

Importantly, hegemony does not imply total domination or absence of resistance. Indonesian digital spaces also host vibrant counter-hegemonic expressions—from grassroots activism to independent journalism and satirical commentary. However, the visibility and sustainability of these alternatives remain uneven, often constrained by platform algorithms, funding limitations, and regulatory pressures. The struggle over meaning therefore unfolds within asymmetrical power conditions that shape which voices are normalized and which remain peripheral.

Popular Culture and Cultural Hegemony

Stuart Hall (1981) reconceptualized popular culture not as a passive reflection of mass taste but as a contested terrain where ideological struggle is enacted. Popular culture is simultaneously a site of incorporation and resistance: dominant groups attempt to encode preferred meanings into cultural products, while audiences decode them in diverse and sometimes oppositional ways. This encoding/decoding model underscores the active role of audiences while acknowledging structural constraints embedded in production processes.

In the digital era, the circulation of popular culture has accelerated dramatically. Viral memes, music trends, fashion aesthetics, and political slogans can spread across continents within hours. Social media platforms enable user-generated content, blurring distinctions between producers and consumers. Yet, platform infrastructures shape which cultural expressions gain prominence. Trends that resonate with globalized, commercially viable aesthetics—often influenced by Western cultural industries—tend to achieve broader algorithmic amplification.

Pierre Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital offers further analytical depth. Cultural capital refers to the symbolic resources—knowledge, tastes, competencies—that confer social distinction and legitimacy. In Indonesian digital media, fluency in English, familiarity with global pop culture, and alignment with cosmopolitan lifestyles frequently function as markers of status. Western music genres, Netflix-style storytelling conventions, and Instagram-ready aesthetics are often valorized as modern and sophisticated. Meanwhile, regional languages, local art forms, and traditional performances may receive comparatively limited digital visibility, reinforcing hierarchies between “global” and “local” cultural forms.

This dynamic does not imply the disappearance of local culture. On the contrary, digital platforms have facilitated the revival and reinterpretation of traditional arts through creative adaptation. However, the metrics of visibility—likes, shares, monetization potential—often privilege forms that align with dominant global trends. Cultural hegemony thus operates through subtle valuation processes, shaping aspirations, identities, and perceptions of modernity.

Ultimately, the intersection of social constructionism, hegemony theory, and cultural capital analysis illuminates the layered power dynamics of contemporary digital media in Indonesia. Media institutions construct social realities through framing practices; ownership structures and political alliances embed ideological alignments; algorithmic systems amplify emotionally resonant and commercially profitable content; and popular culture becomes a terrain where distinctions of class, identity, and belonging are negotiated. Together, these processes demonstrate that digital media does not merely reflect Indonesian society—it actively participates in producing the symbolic order through which society understands itself.

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This study employs a critical mixed-methods design (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2002) integrating quantitative survey methods, critical discourse analysis (CDA), and qualitative in-depth interviews. The critical paradigm is selected because the research questions concern not merely the description of media effects but the analysis of power relations embedded in media production and consumption.

Quantitative Survey

A structured survey was administered to 428 adults in Medan ($n = 156$), Jakarta ($n = 152$), and Surabaya ($n = 120$), selected as representing Indonesia's regional media consumption diversity. Respondents were recruited through quota sampling ensuring representation by age group (18–29: 35%; 30–44: 38%; 45+: 27%), gender (50% male, 50% female), and education level. Validated instruments measured media consumption patterns (Media Consumption Inventory, $\alpha = 0.86$), reality perception, frame adoption (Media Framing Susceptibility Scale, $\alpha = 0.84$), and critical media literacy (CML Scale, $\alpha = 0.81$).

Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2003; van Dijk, 2008) was applied to 240 news items—40 from each of six major Indonesian online news platforms: Kompas.com, Detik.com, Republika.co.id, CNN Indonesia, Tempo.co, and Tribunnews.com—sampled purposively to cover five issue domains: national politics, economic policy, social conflict, cultural identity, and environmental issues. CDA examined lexical choices, syntactic structures, rhetorical strategies, source attribution patterns, and the ideological assumptions naturalized through journalistic conventions.

In-Depth Interviews

Thirty-two semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 20 media consumers (representing diverse age, education, and political orientation profiles) and 12 media producers (journalists, editors, and social media managers). Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and analyzed through interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA; Smith et al., 2009).

RESULTS

Digital Media as Primary Reality-Defining Institution

Survey results reveal that 74.3% of respondents designate online news portals as their primary source for understanding social reality, with social media platforms serving as the primary reality-reference for 71.8% of the 18–29 age cohort. The strong majority (68.4%) reported that their

understanding of political events is 'mainly or entirely' shaped by digital media consumption. The relationship between media consumption and uncritical reality acceptance is significantly moderated by critical media literacy: respondents scoring in the top CML quartile demonstrated substantially lower frame adoption rates ($M = 2.34$) compared to bottom-quartile respondents ($M = 3.87$), a difference significant at $p < 0.001$.

Ideological Framing in Indonesian Digital News

Critical discourse analysis revealed consistent dominance of elite and institutional frames, with an average of 63.1% of news items reproducing perspectives aligned with establishment interests. Economic policy coverage exhibited the highest frame concentration (78.3% elite/institutional), with labor and informal sector perspectives systematically marginalized. Environmental coverage showed the greatest diversity (critical-structural frames in 18.3% of items), reflecting NGO-affiliated journalism's influence.

Table 2. Frame Analysis: Dominant Ideological Frames by Issue Domain (N = 240 news items)

Issue Domain	Elite Frame (%)	Populist Frame (%)	Critical Frame (%)	Marginalized Voices
National Politics	71.4%	22.1%	6.5%	Grassroots movements, minority parties
Economic Policy	78.3%	14.2%	7.5%	Labor unions, informal sector workers
Social Conflict	48.6%	44.8%	6.6%	Structural causes, marginalized communities
Cultural Identity	54.2%	31.4%	14.4%	Regional/ethnic minority voices
Environmental Issues	62.8%	18.9%	18.3%	Indigenous communities, environmental NGOs
Overall Average	63.1%	26.3%	10.6%	Systematically subaltern voices

Source: Critical discourse analysis of online news items (n=240), 2024.

Table 3. Critical Media Literacy and Frame Adoption by Demographic Group (N = 428)

Group	CML Score M (SD)	Frame Adoption M (SD)	Verification Rate (%)	r (CML × Adoption)
Age 18–29 (n=150)	3.21 (0.74)	3.42 (0.81)	34.7%	-.541**
Age 30–44 (n=163)	3.48 (0.68)	3.14 (0.77)	41.2%	-.587**
Age 45+ (n=115)	3.12 (0.81)	3.68 (0.84)	28.3%	-.512**
University-educated (n=248)	3.72 (0.62)	2.98 (0.71)	48.4%	-.623**
High school or below (n=180)	2.84 (0.79)	3.81 (0.82)	22.8%	-.498**
Overall (n=428)	3.34 (0.76)	3.34 (0.82)	36.9%	-.574**

Note: CML = Critical Media Literacy (1–5 scale); Frame Adoption (1–5 scale, higher = greater adoption); ** $p < .001$.

Source: Survey data analysis, SPSS 27, 2024.

DISCUSSION

The convergent quantitative and qualitative evidence constructs a coherent and analytically robust picture of Indonesian digital media as a powerful institution of reality construction operating largely in alignment with dominant ideological frameworks. The empirical finding that elite frames account for 63.1% of dominant narrative structures across sampled digital content is not merely a

descriptive statistic; it is theoretically significant. It substantiates the continuing relevance of Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony in the contemporary platform society. Although the technological infrastructure of communication has shifted from broadcast monopolies to networked digital ecosystems, the structural tendency to privilege elite interpretations persists. What has changed is not the existence of ideological reproduction, but its mechanisms: from centralized editorial gatekeeping to algorithmically curated personalization.

In Gramscian terms, hegemony operates most effectively when power is exercised through consent rather than coercion. The normalization of elite frames within Indonesian digital media illustrates precisely this process. Political-economic elites, media conglomerates, and platform corporations do not need to suppress dissent overtly when their interpretive frameworks are already embedded within the everyday informational environment. Algorithmic systems amplify narratives that align with institutional authority, official sources, and commercially viable discourse. Consequently, elite-defined problems, solutions, and moral evaluations are rendered as "common sense," while structural critiques or systemic alternatives remain marginal. The 63.1% dominance rate quantitatively confirms that hegemonic stabilization remains a defining characteristic of the digital public sphere.

However, the findings also complicate deterministic models of media effects. The statistically significant inverse correlation between critical media literacy and frame adoption ($r = -0.574$, $p < 0.001$) demonstrates that ideological influence is neither automatic nor uniform. To illustrate the magnitude and direction of this relationship, the correlation can be formally represented as follows:

$$r = -0.574$$

This moderately strong negative coefficient indicates that as levels of critical media literacy increase, the likelihood of uncritical acceptance of dominant frames decreases substantially. In substantive terms, individuals equipped with analytical competencies—such as source evaluation, bias recognition, contextualization skills, and awareness of framing techniques—exhibit greater resistance to hegemonic narratives. The statistical significance ($p < 0.001$) further confirms that this relationship is highly unlikely to be due to chance.

Theoretically, this finding aligns with cultural studies traditions that emphasize audience agency. Stuart Hall's encoding/decoding model provides an especially illuminating interpretive lens. According to Hall, media producers encode preferred meanings into texts, but audiences decode these meanings in diverse ways depending on their social position, lived experience, and ideological resources. The qualitative data reveal that informants rarely occupied purely dominant or purely oppositional decoding positions. Instead, most demonstrated negotiated readings—accepting official frames in domains where they lacked experiential knowledge, while resisting or reinterpreting them in areas where personal experience contradicted media narratives.

For example, respondents often accepted macroeconomic policy frames presented by national news portals, citing limited expertise in economic analysis. Yet the same individuals exhibited skepticism toward media portrayals of labor precarity or regional development disparities when these issues intersected directly with their lived realities. This pattern underscores that hegemony functions unevenly across domains. Acceptance is conditional, context-dependent, and mediated by experiential proximity. Negotiated decoding positions thus constitute a critical buffer against total ideological incorporation, though they do not eliminate hegemonic influence altogether.

The concept of the "algorithm trap," frequently articulated by informants, represents a specifically digital-age intensification of hegemonic dynamics. Unlike traditional broadcast systems that disseminated a relatively uniform dominant frame to mass audiences, algorithmic recommendation systems personalize informational exposure. Platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and TikTok curate content streams based on behavioral data—watch time, click patterns, interaction

histories, and inferred preferences. This personalization creates ideologically segmented micro-publics rather than a single, unified audience.

Eli Pariser conceptualized this phenomenon as the “filter bubble,” wherein users are increasingly exposed to information that confirms prior beliefs while contradictory perspectives are algorithmically deprioritized. In the Indonesian context, this dynamic intensifies political polarization and narrows interpretive diversity. Informants described gradually noticing that their feeds became saturated with similar viewpoints, reinforcing particular narratives about governance, religion, nationalism, or social movements. Yet many initially interpreted this repetition as organic consensus rather than algorithmic curation.

This misrecognition is central to the power of personalized hegemony. When dominant frames are encountered repeatedly within a tailored feed, they appear not as imposed ideology but as reflections of one’s authentic preferences. The algorithm does not simply select content; it subtly shapes the horizon of perceived normality. In doing so, it transforms ideological exposure into a self-confirming loop. Users interpret algorithmic output as evidence of majority opinion or shared social reality, thereby deepening consent.

The algorithm trap thus differs qualitatively from earlier hegemonic forms. Broadcast-era dominance relied on centralized editorial authority; digital-era dominance operates through decentralized personalization. Paradoxically, greater individualization can produce deeper ideological enclosure. Because users experience their feeds as uniquely curated, they are less likely to perceive structural manipulation. This opacity renders algorithmic power less visible and more difficult to contest.

Within this environment, critical media literacy emerges as an essential democratic resource rather than a supplementary skill. If hegemony now operates through personalized data infrastructures, resistance requires not only ideological awareness but also technical understanding of algorithmic systems. Literacy must extend beyond traditional source criticism to include comprehension of data profiling, engagement optimization, and platform economics. The negative correlation between literacy and frame adoption suggests that such competencies meaningfully disrupt hegemonic absorption. Individuals who recognize algorithmic incentives—such as the privileging of emotionally arousing or polarizing content—are better positioned to contextualize what appears in their feeds.

Nevertheless, literacy alone cannot fully neutralize structural asymmetries. Ownership concentration, advertising-based revenue models, and political-economic alliances continue to shape content production at systemic levels. Audience agency operates within constrained informational architectures. Thus, while the findings affirm the importance of individual critical capacity, they also underscore the necessity of institutional reforms—greater transparency in algorithmic governance, diversification of media ownership, and strengthened public-interest journalism.

In sum, the integrated evidence reveals a complex interplay between structure and agency in Indonesian digital media. Elite frames retain structural dominance, confirming the endurance of hegemonic dynamics in the platform age. Yet the significant inverse relationship between media literacy and frame adoption demonstrates that ideological reproduction is probabilistic rather than deterministic. Hall’s encoding/decoding model clarifies how negotiated readings mediate hegemonic influence, while the algorithm trap concept highlights the intensified personalization of consent. Together, these findings portray Indonesian digital media as neither a monolithic instrument of domination nor a fully democratized space of free interpretation, but as a contested terrain where algorithmic infrastructures, elite interests, and critical citizen competencies continuously interact to shape the construction of social reality.

CONCLUSION

This study provides comprehensive evidence that digital communication technologies function as powerful institutions of social reality construction, public opinion formation, and ideological hegemony in contemporary Indonesia. The dominance of elite frames in online news (63.1%), the designation of digital platforms as the primary reality-defining institution by 74.3% of respondents, and the consistent marginalization of subaltern perspectives collectively confirm that the digital information revolution has intensified rather than resolved the power asymmetries in mediated reality construction. Yet the protective power of critical media literacy and the evidence of negotiated audience decoding indicate that digital media power is contested and resistible, motivating the primary policy recommendation: systematic integration of critical media literacy education into the Indonesian national curriculum as an essential investment in democratic citizenship for the algorithmic age.

REFERENCES

- Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality*. Doubleday.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste*. Harvard University Press.
- Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing discourse: Textual analysis for social research*. Routledge.
- Gitlin, T. (1980). *The whole world is watching*. University of California Press.
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the prison notebooks*. Lawrence and Wishart.
- Hall, S. (1980). Encoding/decoding. In S. Hall et al. (Eds.), *Culture, media, language* (pp. 128–138). Hutchinson.
- Hall, S. (1981). Notes on deconstructing 'the popular.' In R. Samuel (Ed.), *People's history and socialist theory* (pp. 227–240). Routledge.
- Kincheloe, J. L., & McLaren, P. (2002). Rethinking critical theory and qualitative research. In Y. Zou & E. T. Trueba (Eds.), *Ethnography and schools* (pp. 87–138). Rowman & Littlefield.
- Lash, S. (2002). *Critique of information*. Sage.
- Lim, M. (2017). Freedom to hate: Social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia. *Critical Asian Studies*, 49(3), 411–427.
- McLuhan, M. (1964). *Understanding media: The extensions of man*. McGraw-Hill.
- Pariser, E. (2011). *The filter bubble: What the Internet is hiding from you*. Penguin Press.
- Smith, J. A., Flowers, P., & Larkin, M. (2009). *Interpretative phenomenological analysis*. Sage.
- van Dijk, T. A. (2008). *Discourse and power*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- We Are Social. (2024). *Digital 2024: Indonesia*. We Are Social & Meltwater.
- Zuboff, S. (2019). *The age of surveillance capitalism*. PublicAffairs.